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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No- 890583-CA
Priority No. 2

RICKY PAU1ER,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the warrantless x-ray of Mr. Palmer violate the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution?
A.

Were there exigent circumstances sufficient to

dispense with the warrant requirement?
B.

Was there a "clear indication" the ring would be

found inside Appellant?
C.

Was the x-ray a reasonable method for locating

the ring and was it carried out in a reasonable manner?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Retail
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-6-602(3) (1953 as amended).

Appellant filed a Motion to

Suppress (R. 27) (see Addendum A) which the trial court heard on
August 23, 1989.

The trial court denied that motion (T. 81).

Immediately thereafter, Appellant entered a conditional plea of
guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App.
1988) , whereby Appellant explicitly preserved his right to appeal
the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress (R. 37,
T. 81-2).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 3, 1989, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Lisa Hurtado, a
part-time security guard at Sears, received a page calling her to
the jewelry counter.

According to Ms. Hurtado, when she arrived at

the jewelry counter, the salesman informed her that a customer had
switched a diamond ring and had just left the store through a door
which was about eight feet away (T. 5). Ms. Hurtado examined the
switched ring, then went out the door after the customer (T. 5).
When Ms. Hurtado got outside the door, she saw a young man
walking at a slow pace near the car closest to the store (T. 6).
She followed the young man as he walked to the south and watched him
to make sure that he did not discard anything (T. 7 ) . She did not
see him make any throwing motions while watching him (T. 7 ) .
A backup security guard joined the first guard, and the
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pair stopped the young man across the street from Sears and told him
that they were from the store and would like him to return to the
store with them (T. 7-8). They initially told him that they had
stopped him in conjunction with the diamond ring he had just looked
at (T. 8). The young man, the Defendant in this case, agreed to
return to the store with the pair (T. 8)•
After the trio entered the Sears security office, the
guards informed Mr. Palmer that they believed he had switched a fake
ring with the Sears diamond ring.

Mr. Palmer denied that assertion

and said that he did not have the ring (T. 9 ) .
A security officer did a pat-down search of Mr. Palmer's
clothes but did not find the ring (T. 9 ) . Ms. Hurtado checked on
the computer to be sure that the ring in question had not been
purchased, then telephoned police (T. 11).
Officer Hendrix was the first officer to arrive, followed
later by two backup officers.

The officers were uncertain as to how

to proceed, so they called their supervisor, Sgt. Mayo, who also
went to the store (T. 12). Sgt. Mayo and another officer searched
Mr. Palmer's clothing and strip-searched Mr. Palmer at the Sears
security office (T. 28, 29). Sgt. Mayo then called the Salt Lake
County Attorney's office for advice on how to proceed (T. 28).
Sgt. Mayo also called the jail and was told that, although
Mr. Palmer could be placed in isolation in a cell with a toilet that
did not flush, he could not be watched constantly (T. 33-4).
Sgt. Mayo then "negotiated" with Mr. Palmer and requested
consent from Mr. Palmer to submit him to an x-ray (T. 28, 30, 31).

Mr. Palmer asked a couple of "what if" questions, then, according to
Ms. Hurtado, said, "Well, I guess I will submit to the x-ray then.
It really doesn't make a difference" (T. 13).
Sgt. Mayo told the officers to take Mr. Palmer to the
hospital for an x-ray and to advise the Sergeant of the results
(T. 28-9).

It was getting dark at that point, and cars were leaving

the Sears parking lot (T. 29). Sgt. Mayo was convinced Mr. Palmer
had swallowed the ring, but, if he was wrong and the x-ray was
negative, he intended to send more officers to search the portion of
the Sears parking lot where cars had been parked (T. 37).
According to Ms. Hurtado, before leaving for the hospital,
Appellant said something indicating that he might have had the ring
and might have thrown it on the roof (T. 14). A security guard
apparently got on the roof and searched the ledge (T. 14).
Ms. Hurtado also conducted two "walk through" searches,
retracing the steps Mr. Palmer had apparently taken.

One of those

"walk through" searches was with store personnel and the other with
police officers (T. 15). She, along with two other security guards,
also searched the garbage can, balloon machine and pay telephones
and thoroughly searched the entry way and portion of the driveway
where Mr. Palmer had passed unobserved (T. 21-2).

Four or five

officers also thoroughly searched the Sears parking lot in an effort
to locate the ring (T. 27, 36).
Sgt. Mayo understood that Mr. Palmer had been watched at
all times after leaving the jewelry counter (T. 37). Although the
Sergeant acknowledged that it would take less than two hours to
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obtain a warrant by telephone, based on his conversation with a
Deputy County Attorney, he believed that he did not need a warrant
(T. 40, 41).
At about 7:20 p.m., Officer Hendrix left Sears to take
Mr. Palmer to the hospital for an x-ray.

It was starting to get

dark at that time (T. 13, 15).
At the hospital, Mr. Palmer informed the officers that he
did not want to be x-rayed (T. 46, 50, 58). The officers told him
he had no choice (T. 46, 50). The officers believed that, based on
the information conveyed by Sgt. Mayo, they did not need consent or
a search warrant to x-ray Mr. Palmer (T. 61).
When Mr. Palmer was informed that he would be required to
have an x-ray regardless of his lack of consent, he became combative
and, according to the x-ray technician, attempted to kick the x-ray
tube (T. 46, 50-1).

It was clear that Mr. Palmer's combativeness

was resistance to being x-rayed and would end if the officers
stopped trying to x-ray him (T. 51).
At least three officers pinned Mr. Palmer to the wall
(T. 52). One grabbed him by the throat, and the others restrained
him; they then dragged him, struggling, to the x-ray table (T. 52).
Mr. Palmer was in handcuffs at this time, and the officers
physically led him to the table and placed him on that table.

They

placed a restraint over his upper thighs, and an officer held him
down on the table (T. 53). The officer who remained in the room to
hold down Mr. Palmer was given a lead gown to cover himself because
of the risk of radiation affecting him (T. 53-54).

The x-ray

technician pointed out that he had refused to do x-rays on patients
because of the risk (T. 54).
The x-ray procedure was completed at 9:30 p.m. (T. 45). A
shape resembling a ring was evident in the x-ray (T. 46).
The officers arrested Mr. Palmer and placed him in an
isolation cell at the Salt Lake County Jail.

The environment in the

isolation cell was controlled so that feces were not able to leave
(T. 61). Mr. Palmer thereafter "passed" the ring and officers
recovered it (T. 61-2).
Mr. Palmer filed a motion to suppress the x-ray and all
evidence arising therefrom, including the ring, based upon the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution (see Addendum A ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A police ordered x-ray of an individual is a search which
is protected by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution.
In determining whether a warrantless x-ray search violates the
fourth amendment, all three prongs of the test for bodily intrusion
searches outlined in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
must be met.

That test is:

(1) exigent circumstances which justify

the warrantless bodily intrusion exist, (2) there is a clear
indication the evidence will be found where anticipated, and (3) the
intrusion is a reasonable method for obtaining the evidence and was
carried out in a reasonable manner.
Exigent circumstances which would justify dispensing with
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the warrant requirement did not exist in this case.

Where the

police seek to make a bodily intrusion of an in-custody defendant, a
very strong preference for a warrant exists.

The slight chance that

the officers would have to search a portion of the parking lot if
the ring were not located inside the Appellant is not an exigent
circumstance.
A "clear indication" requires, at the very least, probable
cause to believe the ring would be found inside Appellant.

No one

testified that he or she saw Appellant in possession of the ring or
make any moves suggesting he might have swallowed it, and Appellant
was unobserved for a period of time during which he could have
handed the ring to another person.

Therefore, there was not a

"clear indication" that the ring would be located inside Mr. Palmer
during the x-ray procedure.
Because of the potential risk of harm to an individual's
physical and genetic well-being, x-rays are a highy intrusive
procedure.

Less intrusive alternatives existed in this case.

The

method was therefore unreasonable under the circumstances of this
case.
The excessive use of force, including an officer grabbing
Appellant by the throat and holding him in that position while other
officers also held him as he struggled was an unreasonable manner in
which to conduct the x-ray.
Because the warrantless x-ray search violated the fourth
amendment, the x-ray and ring seized as a result of the x-ray should
be suppressed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. THE WARRANTLESS X-RAY OF APPELLANT VIOLATED
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

It provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The general rule under the fourth amendment is that officers must
obtain a search warrant for searches of homes, personal effects, and
intrusions into the body.
757, 770 (1966).

See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.

Warrantless searches are considered per se

unreasonable unless the State sustains its burden of proving that
the warrantless search is justified under an exception to the
warrant requirement.

See State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 359 (Ha.

1982); People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d 445, 447 (111. App. 5 Dist.
1987); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
Although the importance of having a neutral, informed and
detached magistrate assess whether a search is appropriate is
emphasized throughout fourth amendment case law, the role of a
neutral magistrate takes on increased importance where the decision
is whether to invade a person's body.

The Schmerber Court

acknowledged that the role of a neutral magistrate in bodily
intrusion searches was "indisputable and great" and recognized a
greater interest in keeping one's body free from unreasonable
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intrusions than in protecting one's home.

Id.

The Court stated:

Because we are dealing with intrusions into the
human body rather than state interference with
property relationships or private papers—"houses,
papers and effects"—we write on a clean slate.
Id. at 767-8.

In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753f 760 (1985), the

Court noted that the bodily intrusion in Schmerber;
perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and
deep rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court
recognized that fourth amendment analysis does
require a discerning inquiry into the facts and
circumstances to determine whether the intrusion was
justifiable.
(Emphasis added.)

In State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 359 (Haw. 1982),

the Court noted that:

"There is no expectation of privacy of

greater legitimacy than that which we have in our 'private parts'
(footnote omitted)."
In addition, when an individual is in custody, the
importance of having a neutral magistrate assess the evidence before
conducting a search becomes increasingly important, while the
reasons for dispensing with the warrant "evaporate."

See United

States v. Montova de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 553 n.21 (1985)
(citing Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).

Hence, where

the State contemplates a bodily intrusion of an in-custody
defendant, there is a strong preference for a search warrant.
Schmerber is the lead case discussing the interaction
between the fourth amendment and bodily intrusions by the State.

In

Schmerber, officers arrested the defendant for driving under the
influence of alcohol.

Without obtaining a search warrant, officers

directed a physician to withdraw blood from the defendant for a

chemical analysis of blood alcohol content.

The Court held that the

defendant's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights were not violated
under the circumstances of the case since (1) exigent circumstances
existed which justified the immediate withdrawal of the blood
without waiting for a warrant because during any delay, the alcohol
would be absorbed by the defendant's body and the blood alcohol
level dissipate, (2) there was a clear indication that alcohol would
be found in the defendant's bloodstream, and (3) the blood alcohol
test chosen was a reasonable test for determining blood alcohol
content and was performed in a reasonable manner.

The Schmerber

Court cautioned, however, that its holding that "the Constitution
does not forbid the state's minor intrusions into an individual's
body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that
it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions."

Id. at 772.

The initial inquiry where the State has invaded an
individual's body without a warrant is whether the nature of the
invasion amounts to a search or seizure, implicating the fourth
amendment, or is so minor that the fourth amendment is not
applicable.

It is well accepted by courts which have addressed the

issue that an x-ray is a bodily intrusion which falls within the
protection of the fourth amendment.1

1

See United States v. Allen,

At least one court seems to have characterized an x-ray
as a "seizure" (see United States v. Allen, 337 F.Supp. at 1043)
while most courts consider it a search (see, e.g., United States v.
Ek, 676 F.2d at 382-3). As the Schmerber Court noted, "[S]uch
testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons,' and
(continued)
- i n -

337 F.Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Ek, 676
F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Anonymous, 353 A.2d 789,
794-5 (Conn. 1976); State v. Mabon, 648 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tenn. Cr.
App. 1982); People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2nd at 447.
Various courts have recognized that because x-rays
penetrate the body and create potential health hazards for an
individual and possibly for succeeding generations, the nature of
the intrusion is comparable to at least that of withdrawal of blood,
and, according to some courts, on par in intrusiveness with a body
cavity search.

See United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d at 382 ("An x-ray

search, although perhaps not so humiliating as a strip search,
nevertheless is more intrusive since the search is potentially
harmful to the health of the suspect."); Allen, 337 F.Supp. at 1043
("[Considering that x-rays actually penetrate the body we cannot
say as a matter of law that it is less an invasion than the taking
of blood."); see generally United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. at 561-2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Dissent discusses
estimates that routine medical x-rays take six days off a person's
life expectancy and concern regarding cumulative effect of x-rays on
individual's biological and genetic well-being.).

Hence, the fourth

amendment is applicable to the instant case where the officers
ordered a technician to x-ray Appellant without first obtaining a

(footnote 1 continued)
depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning
of that Amendment." 384 U.S. at 767. Regardless of whether an
x-ray is characterized as a search or a seizure, the fourth
amendment is applicable.

warrant.
In order for the x-ray procedure to be upheld, the State
has the burden of proving that all three prongs of the Schmerber
test were met.

Those three prongs are:

(1) exigent circumstances

justified the warrantless intrusion, (2) there was a clear
indication evidence would be found in the place to be searched, and
(3) the x-ray was a reasonable method for locating the evidence and
was carried out in a reasonable manner.

A. THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY
DISPENSING WITH THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
Although search warrants are favored where bodily
intrusions of in-custody defendants are contemplated, courts have
dispensed with the requirement where an emergency situation requires
that the officers proceed without waiting for a warrant.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-1.

See

An exigent circumstance, in the

context of a bodily intrusion, has been defined as "an emergency
which threatens destruction of the evidence during the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant . . . ."

State v. Fontenant, 383

So.2d 365, 367 (La. 1980) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
at 770); see also Anonymous, 353 A.2d at 795 (test under Schmerber
for whether exigent circumstances exist which justify dispensing
with warrant requirement where bodily intrusion involved is whether
risk exists that evidence will be destroyed during delay in
obtaining warrant); Mabon, 648 S.W.2d at 275 (no exigent
circumstances justifying warrantless x-rays since metal particles

and gunshot would remain in defendant's arm indefinitely and no
possibility evidence would disappear).
In State v. Clark, 654 P.2d at 360, the Court held that
exigent circumstances justifying dispensing with the warrant
requirement did not exist since the currency the defendant was
believed to have concealed in her vagina would not dissolve or
otherwise dissipate while officers obtained a warrant, and officers
could have detained the suspect in a place and manner, under
observation, so as to preclude destruction of the evidence pending
issuance of the warrant.

See also People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d

624, 631 (Cal. 1975) (no exigent circumstances since heroin in
balloons would not dissolve in suspect's system, and officers could
have kept suspect in isolation cell, under surveillance, until
balloons passed through system); Fontenant, 383 So.2d at 367 (no
exigent circumstances where pill bottle believed to be secreted in
vagina would not dissolve, and suspect could have been guarded and
prevented from destroying evidence while search warrant obtained).
The Clark Court also noted that the officers had procedures
available to them by which they could obtain a warrant with minimal
delay and that inconvenience to the officers in securing a warrant
"carries little weight in this jurisdiction as a reason to bypass
the fourth amendment.
1980)."

See State v. Texeira, 609 P.2d 131, 136 (Ha.

Clark, 654 P.2d at 361.
In the present case, the trial court found that a warrant

was not necessary since exigent circumstances existed "because of
the value of the ring and the approaching darkness, and the fact

that the parking lot was such a public area" (T. 78)• The trial
court focused on the need to search the parking lot if the ring was
not found inside Appellant as a result of the x-ray, suggesting that
the ring would be destroyed or concealed by someone in the parking
lot if the officers did not act quickly in x-raying Mr. Palmer
(T. 78, 79). Such a depiction of the exigent circumstances
necessary to dispense with the warrant requirement where a bodily
intrusion is involved is incorrect; the focus under Schmerber and
the bulk of its progeny is whether the evidence, if located in the
place or person to be searched, would disappear from that place or
person while a warrant is being obtained, and not whether the
officers run a risk that evidence will disappear from some other
place if it turns out that they were wrong in believing the evidence
was located in the place or person which was the focus of the search.
The trial court relied on People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d
445 (111. App. 5 Dist. 1987), in reaching its decision that exigent
circumstances existed because the officer would have to search the
Sears parking lot immediately if the ring was not found inside
Appellant.

Mr. Palmer submits that the Williams Court's

characterization of such alternate need to search as an exigent
circumstance is incorrect under Schmerber and succeeding cases.
Searches involving bodily intrusion are a special type of
search, case law for which evolved from a "clean slate" in
Schmerber.
760.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-8, 771; Lee, 470 U.S. at

Bodily intrusion searches require a "clear indication" that

the evidence will be found as anticipated (see discussion infra at
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18-21).

If there is a "clear indication" that the evidence will be

found during the body search, then it would be extremely unlikely
that the evidence would be found elsewhere.

This clear indication

requirement precludes a court from finding an exigent circumstance
based on a chance that the officers were wrong in believing that the
item was in the body and, if proved wrong, would have to search
elsewhere.
In addition, the Williams exigent circumstances adopted by
the trial court in this case would be applicable to almost any
bodily intrusion case and, if considered a permissible exigent
circumstance, could swallow the rule.

For instance, in State v.

Fontenant. where the Court held that exigent circumstances did not
exist, two women left a pharmacy with a bottle of pills and were
detained by police shortly thereafter while sitting in their car
outside the pharmacy.

383 So.2d at 367.

If the pills had not been

found in the vagina of one of the women, officers would have
searched the vicinity where the women had been for the pills. Along
the same lines, in State v. Clark, had the officers not found the
currency secreted in the defendant's vagina, they would have had to
search the hotel room and other areas where the defendant had been
to locate the currency.

See 654 P.2d at 360-1.

See also People v.

Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 626.
In Clark, the Court noted that "the term exigent
circumstances is incapable of precise definition (citation
omitted)."

Clark, 654 P.2d at 360. The Court noted that exigent

circumstances "include[] situations presenting an immediate danger

—
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to life or of serious injury or an immediate threatened removal or
destruction of evidence."

Id. at 360 (citation omitted).

In the

present case, the possible need to search the Sears parking lot in
the future based on the chance that someone might find the ring and
destroy it if it were not inside Appellant is not an immediate
threat of destruction of the evidence.
In the event this Court disagrees and believes that the
chance that officers would have to search elsewhere if the evidence
was not found inside Appellant is an exigent circumstance, the facts
of the instant case are nevertheless distinguishable from those in
Williams.

In Williams, officers would have had to search the entire

thoroughfare where the defendant had been.

In the present case,

Mr. Palmer was unobserved only while in the breezeway while leaving
the store and in a small portion of the parking lot between the exit
and the first row of cars (T. 5-6). Officers and security personnel
had searched everywhere except under the cars (T. 9, 14, 15, 21-2,
28, 29). If the ring was not inside Mr. Palmer, it was either under
the cars in the parking lot or had been handed to another person
during the period of time that Mr. Palmer was unobserved.

Although

Sgt. Mayo indicated that he would need a number of men to search the
parking lot if the ring were not inside Mr. Palmer, the testimony as
a whole establishes that only a small portion of the parking lot
would have had to be searched, unlike the large vicinity that the
officers would have had to search in Williams (T. 5-6, 37).
Sgt. Mayo could easily have left an officer or officers to
watch the parking lot while another officer obtained a search
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warrant and had the x-ray taken•

Had any persons bent down and

picked something up during the interim, the remaining officer could
have questioned such persons to make sure they did not have the
missing ring.
The trial court emphasized the fact that it would soon be
dark in finding exigent circumstances.

The evidence establishes

that it was already getting dark when the officers left for the
hospital with Appellant at approximately 7:20 p.m. (T. 15).
Regardless of whether the officers waited for a warrant or simply
took the x-ray without one, it was going to be dark by the time the
x-ray was completed.

It was, in fact, 9:30 p.m. and dark outside

when the technician finished x-raying Mr. Palmer (T. 45). Hence,
regardless of whether officers obtained a warrant, had the ring not
been found inside Mr. Palmer, they would have been searching the
parking lot in the dark.

Approaching darkness did not, in this

case, establish an emergency situation requiring dispensing with the
warrant requirement.
The trial courts reliance on the value of the ring in
finding an exigent circumstance is also flawed (see T. 78). The
value of an item is irrelevant in determining whether an exigent
circumstance exists which justifies dispensing with a warrant before
intruding on an individual's body.

The appropriate focus is whether

the evidence might be destroyed or disappear from the place to be
searched during the delay while officers obtain a warrant.
Furthermore, waiting for a warrant would not have diminished the

value of the ring.2
The State failed to sustain its burden of proving that
exigent circumstances existed in this case so as to justify the
intrusion in the instant case without a warrant.3
Officers could have obtained a warrant in less than two
hours and did not seem concerned about rushing Mr. Palmer to the
hospital for an x-ray since at least an hour passed between the time
when the security guard was first called and the departure of
Mr. Palmer for the hospital (T. 4, 15). Exigent circumstances did
not exist in this case, and Mr. Palmer's fourth amendment rights
were therefore violated by the officers' failure to obtain a warrant
before proceeding with the x-ray.

B. THERE WAS NOT A "CLEAR INDICATION" THAT THE RING
WOULD BE FOUND INSIDE APPELLANT.
The second prong of the Schmerber test requires that there
be a "clear indication" that the evidence sought will be found in
order to justify a bodily intrusion.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.

Since the decision in Schmerber, commentators and courts have
discussed the meaning of the term "clear indication" and "[t]he
issue of whether this 'clear indication' requirement is more

2

The trial court's determination that the ring was
valuable seems to be based on the fact that it was a diamond. No
evidence was taken as to the value of the ring. See T. 9, 76.
3

The State has the burden of proving that, based on
specific facts, exigent circumstances required proceeding without a
warrant. See State v. Clark, 654 P.2d at 360.

demanding than the normal probable cause requirement is a matter of
continuing uncertainty (Compare United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, (1985), 473 U.S. 531, 539-40, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310-11,
87 L.Ed.2d 381, 390-91, with 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure,
Section 5.3(c) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987))."

Williams, 510 N.E.2d at

447; see also Note, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily
Intrusions, 68 Marq.L.Rev. 130-53 (1984).
The usual standard under the fourth amendment requires
officers to have probable cause to believe the evidence sought will
be found in the place to be searched.

Given the recognition in

Schmerber that a bodily intrusion is a greater invasion than a
search of a home or papers and permissible only in strictly limited
circumstances, the "clear indication" requirement mandates that, at
the very least, officers have probable cause to believe that the
evidence sought will be found as a result of the bodily intrusion.4
In the present case, the trial judge interpreted "clear
indication" to mean a high probability.
Some of the cases talk about clear indication.
. . . The cases also say that there is not a clear
definition of what that means, but it means more
than probable cause.
It means less than absolute certainty and the best
evidence that I read was that what clear indication
means is that there is a very high probability.
(T. 78).

4

In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 759, the Court noted that
the officers in Schmerber "clearly had probable cause . . . to
believe that a blood test would provide evidence that was
exceptionally probative."

Although the trial judge believed that there was a clear
indication that the ring was inside Appellant, the facts in this
case indicate otherwise,

Mr. Palmer was unobserved from the moment

he left the store until several moments later when Ms. Hurtado
observed him near the first row of cars (T. 5-6, 9-20).

Ms. Hurtado

testified that she received a call that a ring had been switched,
went to the jewelry counter, spoke with the salesman, and examined
the remaining ring before going outside to look for the suspect
(T. 4-5). Although Ms. Hurtado guessed that Mr. Palmer was not
observed "for a half minute," her own testimony suggests that he was
actually unobserved for a longer period of time, during which he
could easily have handed the ring to an accomplice.
After Ms. Hurtado located Appellant in the parking lot, she
observed him continuously (T. 6-7). While being observed,
Mr. Palmer made no motions indicating he had swallowed the ring
(T. 7 ) .
The State did not present any witnesses who had seen
Mr. Palmer in possession of the ring or who had seen him swallow
it.

The State's witnesses did, however, establish that there were

other people at the jewelry counter when the ring was taken, the
parking lot was accessible to the public, and Mr. Palmer had ample
time to dispose of the ring (T. 4-7, 10-11, 19-20).

Although

Ms. Hurtado testified that she saw no one in the parking lot when
she exited the store, it is highly unlikely that an accomplice, once
handed the ring, would stand around waiting for a security guard to
arrive.

The State failed to bear its burden in this case of proving
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that the officers had a "clear indication" that the ring would be
found inside Mr. Palmer.

C. X-RAYING MR. PALMER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE WAS NOT A REASONABLE METHOD, NOR WAS IT
DONE IN A REASONABLE MANNER.
The third prong under Schmerber requires two separate
inquiries:

(1) whether the method chosen was reasonable and

(2) whether the manner in which the test was performed was
reasonable.

1.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-2.

The method was not reasonable.

In determining whether the method chosen is reasonable,
several factors—including the degree of the intrusion; the risk of
harm, trauma or pain; and the essentiality of the test, i.e. whether
a less intrusive alternative exists—are relevant.
Lee, 470 U.S. at 761.

See Winston v.

In Lee, the United States Supreme Court

addressed the issue of whether a compelled surgical procedure to
remove a bullet from a suspect's chest violated the fourth
amendment.

The Court held that such a procedure would violate the

fourth amendment since it would intrude substantially on the
individual's privacy interests and the State had failed to establish
a compelling need for the evidence.
As discussed supra at 11, the potential risks of x-rays and
the concern that x-rays will negatively affect not only the physical
well-being of the individual but also his or her genetic structure

— on

-

is well documented and accepted in case law.

See, e.g., Montoya

de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 561-2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ek, 676
F.2d at 382; Mabon, 648 S.W.2d at 275.

In addition, various courts

have recognized that the intrusiveness of an x-ray is on par with
that of a body cavity search.
F.2d at 382.

See, e.g., United States v. Ek, 67 6

Furthermore, the technician who took the x-ray of

Appellant acknowledged the risks and potential harms of x-rays and
pointed out that because of such risks, he had on occasion refused
to take x-rays of individuals (T. 54). Finally, the technician and
officer present during the x-ray acknowledged the well-known and
accepted fact that risk is associated with x-rays by placing a lead
gown over the officer to protect him from any random rays
(T. 53-4).

The trial judge's attempts to minimize the impact of

x-rays is contrary to the testimony of the technician and the
well-documented case law (see T. 80). The degree of the intrusion
and the risk of harm are substantial in this case.
In determining whether the method was reasonable, the
essentiality of the test must be balanced against the degree of
intrusion and the risk of harm.

In the present case, officers could

have placed Mr. Palmer in isolation and under observation during the
time it would have taken to get a search warrant.

Sgt. Mayo

acknowledged that it would take less than two hours to obtain a
search warrant (T. 40, 41). A single officer guarding Mr. Palmer
for those two hours would have required less resources than sending
at least three officers to the hospital with him for an x-ray.
Furthermore, the ring would have passed through his system in a

-

99

-

short period of time.

Mr. Palmer was ultimately placed in isolation

and the ring passed through his system (T. 61-2) . This could have
been done without obtaining an x-ray.

A warrantless x-ray under the

circumstances in this case was not a reasonable method for locating
the ring.

2. The manner in which the x-ray was conducted was
not reasonable.
The inquiry into whether a bodily intrusion is conducted in
a reasonable manner includes a consideration of whether the test was
conducted "in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices" along with a consideration of the factual circumstances
under which it was taken.

See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-2.

In the

present case, a trained x-ray technician conducted the x-ray at a
hospital after a doctor issued a requisition for such procedure
(T. 43-4).

It is not clear that the technician took a medical

history on Appellant; whether a doctor examined Mr. Palmer, as is
the usual procedure when an x-ray is taken; or whether the procedure
was otherwise carried out in a medically approved fashion (T. 45).
More importantly, however, the facts establish that the officers
used excessive force and acted in an unreasonable manner in
compelling Mr. Palmer to be x-rayed.
The concept of unreasonable use of force during a bodily
intrusion by the State first arose in the context of fourteenth
amendment substantive due process.

In Rochin v. California, 342

U.S. 165 (1952), officers caused an emetic solution to be forced

through a tube into the stomach of the suspect until he vomited.
The Court determined that the police behavior shocked the conscience
and would not allow the conviction to stand.
Since Rochin, various courts have focused on the due
process violation when analyzing excessive use of force or police
misconduct in carrying out a search.

See, e.g., United States v.

Townsend, 151 F.Supp. 378 (D.C. 1957); Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d
851, 853-5 (10th Cir. 1981).
However, it appears that the reliance by the United States
Supreme Court on due process for its decision in Rochin was due, in
part, to the fact that Rochin was decided prior to the fourth
amendment being made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.

See People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 627.

Given that

the fourth amendment is now applicable to the states and in light of
the holding in Schmerber that bodily intrusion searches must be done
in a reasonable manner, it appears that the use of excessive force
in carrying out a bodily intrusion search is more appropriately
raised on fourth amendment grounds rather than on substantive due
process grounds.5

See People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 627.

In Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), the United
States Supreme Court determined that a claim that officers used
excessive force in the course of a "seizure" of a person should be

5

In the event that this Court disagrees, Appellant
alternatively raises the argument that the excessive use of force to
compel the x-ray violates due process under the fourteenth amendment
and cites Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and its
progeny, in support of this argument.
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analyzed under the fourth amendment rather than under substantive
due process.

The rationale of Graham is just as applicable to a

search under the fourth amendment and supports the argument that
excessive use of force by officers in carrying out a bodily
intrusion search should be analyzed under the reasonable manner
prong of the Schmerber test.

See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d

832 (8th Cir. 1986) (suggestion that use of excessive force an
important consideration in determining whether x-ray violated fourth
amendment).
In the instant case, the officers used unreasonable force
in obtaining the x-ray.

Mr. Palmer was in handcuffs and, after

making it clear that he did not want to be x-rayed, became combative
(T. 51-2).

"He made a move to try and kick the x-ray tube,"

according to the technician (T. 51). It was clear that Appellant's
combativeness would stop if officers stopped trying to x-ray him
without a warrant (T. 50-3).
At least three officers rushed toward Appellant and pinned
him against the wall (T. 51-2).

One officer grabbed him by the

throat while at least two others held him by the arms.

Although at

least three officers were holding him by the throat and arms and he
was in handcuffs, Mr. Palmer continued struggling to get away and
voicing opposition to the test (T. 52). One of the officers
continued to hold him by the throat as the officers moved him
towards the table and physically placed him on the table.

They

placed a restraint over Mr. Palmer, and an officer held him down
(T. 52-3).

Carrying a struggling and kicking suspect who is being held
at the throat to a table and strapping him down raises the level of
intrusiveness and establishes that this x-ray was not taken in a
medically approved or otherwise reasonable manner.

Instead, it was

an unreasonable intrusion in violation of the fourth amendment.

D.

THE X-RAY AND THE RING SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.

The fourth amendment is violated in a case where there is a
warrantless bodily intrusion unless the state can establish all
three prongs of the Schmerber test.

In the instant case, not only

one but all three of the prongs were not established.

Therefore,

the x-ray and all of the fruits of the illegally seized x-ray,
including the ring, must be suppressed.
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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See Wong Sun v. United

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the illegally
seized evidence.
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ADDENDUM A

DISTRICT COURT

AUG

7 4 56 ?H '83

JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
v.
Case Nos. 89190071_8FS-^
^8919007lTTs
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

RICKY PALMER,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, RICKY PALMER, by and through his
attorney of record, JAMES c. BRADSHAW, and hereby moves this Court
to suppress all evidence seized in violation of defendant's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures Article I Section 14
Utah State Constitution.

Fourth Amendment U.S. Constitution.

Defendant specifically alleges that the x-ray taken of his person
was an unreasonable warrantless intrusion and it and all derivative
evidence of that illegal search and seizure must be suppressed.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct 205, 96 L.Ed 183 (1952).
DATED

this

day of August, 1989.
ESPECTFUIiLY SUBMITTED,

D E L I V E R E D BY

AUG - 7 1989

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant

